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In J.M. Coetzee’s novel The Schooldays of Jesus (2016), the question of finding the 
‘right education’ for a young child is a central and recurring theme. In particular, the 
novel presents us with two models of maths education. One of these is a fairly 
recognisable practice, and involves intellectualised forms of teaching and learning 
abstract concepts. The other is a rather bizarre educational programme that involves 
a Dance Academy in which numbers are ‘called down from the stars.’ 
 
Coetzee – a Nobel Prize-winning novelist – has been subject to some criticism for 
what has been described as a ‘maddening’ book about ‘silly dancing’ (White, 2016). 
Yet my paper seeks to show how Coetzee’s novel opens up questions of stasis and 
dynamis that, in turn, have important implications for education. To develop my case, 
I shall consider Coetzee’s novel in relation to certain themes from Plato’s 
philosophy, particularly as found in Republic. Recently, there has been renewed 
discussion of the relevance of Plato for educational theoryi – although Plato’s 
philosophy is still far less prevalently discussed in educational journals than the 
works of his student Aristotle.ii Part of the aim of this paper is to add a further 
dimension to the growing revival of interest in Plato for education, by showing how 
Plato’s philosophy connects with certain themes in Coetzee’s literature. In doing so, 
I shall also be working to show how ‘one of the most studied contemporary authors’ 
(Head, 2012), whose work is generating ‘a rapidly expanding field of criticism’ in 
literary studies and philosophy, manifests a central concern with education – and in 
such a way that deserves to be taken seriously by educational philosophers and 
theorists today.iii 
 
At the end of my paper, I shall move to say something more generally about the way 
the discussion presented here serves to highlight the importance of writers of 
literature for education. More specifically, I shall reflect on how recent philosophical 
examinations of the way Coetzee’s writing, ‘obliges us to reflect upon what Socrates 
was already in The Republic calling the “ancient quarrel” between literature and 
philosophy’ has significant educational implications (Haynes and Wilm, 2017, p. 1). iv 
Coetzee’s (and Plato’s) work reveals the internal relation between philosophy and 
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literature. Yet the way philosophy and literature need each other and interweave 
with each other is something that is often suppressed in predominant arguments for 
the value of literature today. Better attention to their interrelation, I will suggest, 
opens new directions for these arguments. In particular, and as we shall come to see, 
it opens new ways of understanding the nature of moral education – as something 
broader and more pervasive than is often recognised by more familiar arguments in 
moral philosophy and education. 
 
Intellectualistic Maths Education 
 
Let us turn, then, to the examples of maths education as they are presented in 
Coetzee’s The Schooldays of Jesus. Both of these involve the experiences of a young 
child named David, who is being looked after by a man named Simón and a woman 
called Ines, after they all arrive to set up life in a new country. As in the case of the 
real Jesus, they seem to be fleeing something and to be wary of contact with the 
authorities. 
 
The first example comes near the start of the novel. Simón and Ines decide to 
appoint a tutor for David, so that he might continue his education in the city into 
which have recently moved (David previously attended a mainstream school in 
another city, but he did not get on well there, and the family fled after David was 
threatened with exile to a ‘remedial school’). The tutor who is appointed, Señor 
Robles, conceives teaching in terms of ‘instilling the elements in a young mind’ 
(Coetzee, 2016, p. 26. Robles suggests that what is first needed is to firmly lay 
foundations, after which ‘we will be ready to erect our mathematical edifice on them’ 
(p. 29). In Robles’ first lesson, he seeks to put his method into practice by teaching 
David ‘what is two?’: 
 
From his breast pocket Señor Robles takes two pens and 
places them side by side on the table. From another pocket he 
produces a little glass bottle, shakes out two white pills, and 
places them beside the pens. ‘What do these’ – his hand 
hovers over the pens – ‘and these’ – his hand hovers over the 
pills – ‘have in common?’ 
The boy is silent. 
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‘Ignoring their use as writing instruments or medicine, 
looking at them simply as objects, is there some property that 
these’ – he shifts the pens slight to the right – ‘and these’ – he 
shifts the pills slightly to the left – ‘have in common? Any 
property that makes them alike?’ 
‘There are two pens and two pills’, says the boy. 
‘Good!’ says Señor Robles. 
‘The two pills are the same but the two pens aren’t the same 
because one is blue and one is red.’ 
‘But they are still two, aren’t they’? 
‘Two. Two for the pens and two for the pills. But they aren’t 
the same two.’ (p. 28). 
 
Their exchanges goes on in much the same way for some time, with Señor Robles 
getting increasingly frustrated with David. What is at stake in this, and in the 
example of maths education we are being given? One thing we might say here is that 
Señor Robles’ foundational approach largely involves making classifications. More 
specifically, Robles teaches ‘two’ by asking David to identify the relevant 
distinguishing characteristics (numerical identity) and to compartmentalise. This is, 
in turn, achieved through processes of abstraction: by thinking in ways that move 
beyond particular instantiations of objects (such as red and blue pens) and towards a 
universal idea or category (that of ‘pen’ in general and then ‘item’ in general). 
Robles’ slow and self-conscious bodily expressions in trying to encourage such ways 
of thinking relay the sense that he sees such practices as highly profound and to be 
revered. There is a certain savouring of abstraction and generalisation being 
exemplified here. 
 
This is further borne out later in the novel when Robles comes to associate the 
capacity to ‘see objects as members of classes’ as the very foundation of thinking (p. 
30). Notably, Robles also further relates this ability to our capacity for language (p. 
30-31). Language, like maths, is hereby portrayed as a tool that allows us to chop up 
and split up the world. Hence the word ‘pill’ is understood to be a label or marker 
that can stand and cover a range of different singular objects. Yet David causes a 
problem for Robles’ smooth picture of inculcation into the established categories and 
sets. He does not ‘go on’ in the intended way (‘two, but they aren’t the same two’). 
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Robles subsequently diagnoses David with having a ‘cognitive defect’ (p. 30). After 
this, David’s education becomes the responsibility of the Academy of Dance. Here, 
the boy learns maths in a different way, from the beautiful dancer Ana Magdalena 
and her husband the composer Juan Sebastian Arroyo.  
 
Dance and Maths Education 
 
As I stated in the introduction, the second model of learning maths that we find in 
The Schooldays of Jesus presents us with a much less familiar picture. Coetzee 
forewarns us of this irregularity, and in their first visit to the Academy, Simón and 
David are told that this ‘is not a regular school’: ‘it is an academy dedicated to the 
training of the soul through music and dance’ (p. 43). In an evening recital for 
parents, Ana Magdalena explains the philosophy behind the Dance Academy further, 
and in ways that reveal something of the connection between maths and dance being 
conceived here:  
 
Uno-dos-tres: is this just a chant we learn at school, the 
mindless chant we call counting; or is there a way of seeing 
through the chant to what lies behind and beyond it, namely 
the realm of the numbers themselves … Our Academy is 
dedicated to guiding the souls of our students toward that 
realm, to bringing them in accord with the great underlying 
movement of the universe, or, as we prefer to say, the dance 
of the universe […] 
 To bring the numbers down from where they reside, to 
allow them to manifest themselves in our midst, to give them 
body, we dance. Yes, here in the Academy we dance, not in a 
graceless, carnal, or disorderly way, but body and soul 
together, so as to bring the numbers to life. As music enters 
and moves us in dance, so the numbers cease to be mere 
ideas, mere phantoms, and become real … 
 
In the dance we call the numbers down from where they live 
among the aloof stars. We surrender ourselves to them in 
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dance, and while we dance, by their grace, they live among 
us. (p. 68). 
 
Clearly, the practices of the Dance Academy are in contrast with the more familiar 
approach enshrined in the teaching of Señor Robles. But what does it advocate 
instead? At the very least, the practices of the Dance Academy appear to be strange 
and mystical. In fact, Coetzee even seems to tempt us with the image that this is just 
mystification – the product of bizarre eccentrics (it is perhaps not too much of a 
stretch to imagine a ‘zany’ drama or dance teacher coming up with a similar kind of 
idea). David’s non-biological father, Simón feels a degree of scepticism, as he listens 
to Ana Magdalena, about what is being proposed by the Academy’s philosophy: ‘The 
training of the soul. He touches Inés’ arm’ (p. 43). Yet, by all accounts, the boy David 
comes to flourish at the Dance Academy. Furthermore, at the end of the book, Simón 
himself seeks lessons from the Dance Academy. Taken in one way, the alternative 
model of maths education we are presented with appears to be just a form of 
mysticism. But is it also possible to see in this something else? 
 
It may be helpful at this point to register the possible connection with a well-known 
historical debate about maths education. Part of progressivism’s concerns during the 
1960s were that children in schools were learning a number calculations such as 
8x8=64 in parrot fashion, because they had spent the morning chanting their eight 
times table with others in class. However, what they memorized remained empty for 
them: they had no sense of how they might apply this in life – in, for example 
working out the area of a floor; nor did the number relationships mean anything to 
them in abstract terms. Thus there was a sense that children were being rushed 
ahead with acquiring the ability to repeat calculations but without appropriate 
understanding of what they were saying or the ability to apply those calculations. 
The numbers were coming to be nothing much more than repeated phrases, without 
the conceptual understanding that was needed.[I think the children were in a sense 
worse than calculating machines. The programming of machines enables them to do 
calculations that are much greater than normal human beings can do (at least to do 
them more quickly). So the machine’s 8 times 8 is logically connected to (4 time 2) 
times (1+1+1+1+1+1+1+1), etc. Yet Progressivism is itself problematic on account 
of its somewhat romanticised conception of childhood and the learning process – and 
the kind of easy relativism into which it seems to slide. 
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Does the Dance Academy model a different kind of maths education – something that 
goes beyond both intellectualism and progressivism? To approach this thought, 
consider how dance might itself be understood as another way in which number 
relations are realised. Put otherwise, consider how dance itself involves patterns and 
rules and counting. These are not, notably, patterns that are to be followed in a 
purely cognitive or cerebral way. While a novice dancer may well be counting in their 
mind the steps being performed in a sequence, part of what it is to be an expert 
dancer is that you lose yourself or get into the flow of the movement. There is, we 
might say, a dynamism in the relation to number that takes place in dancing. The 
patterns and number sequences are felt by the body, are lived. Señor Robles’ 
approach to maths education exemplified intellectualised or cognitive modes of 
abstraction. There is something fixed and static in this. Does the dymamis of the 
Dance Academy recover something important that is lost or exorcised in Robles’ 
approach? Are there implications in this for educational thinking – about the 
teaching and learning of maths, and beyond? 
A Standard Reading of Plato 
 
Where is Plato in relation to this? In a recent paper on The Childhood of Jesus (the 
prequel to The Schooldays of Jesus), Stephen Mulhall has claimed that the presence of 
Plato is ‘hard to miss’ (2017, p. 114). In particular, Mulhall notes how Coetzee’s 
novel embeds in the novel certain arguments put forward in Plato’s Republic. Now, in 
Republic Socrates sets forth in words a vision of the polis and the ideal city. Kallipolis 
will have the education of members of the city as chief among its concerns, not for 
‘the special welfare of any particular class … but … the society as a whole’ (Plato, 
2012, 519e). Appropriate structures and models of education are thus a central and 
recurring theme within this text. In light of this, it is not too far-fetched to suppose 
that The Schooldays of Jesus may itself continue to engage with Platonic ideas – and 
we might even envisage prima facie how these underpin the different models of 
maths education we have been considering hitherto. Note, for example, how in being 
‘dedicated to guiding the souls of our students’ towards ‘the realm of the numbers 
themselves’, the Dance Academy appears to gesture towards one of the most famous 
educational images found in Republic: the theory of Forms. But let us approach such 
claims a little more slowly. 
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Part of the reason for exercising caution here is that, in my view, there are two 
versions of Plato (and the theory of Forms) at work in The Schooldays of Jesus. 
Coetzee is in effect inviting consideration of differing interpretations. One kind of 
interpretation, for example, is the kind we get when reading the theory of Forms in 
connection with another famous educational the image presented in Republic: the 
Divided Line. Let us briefly see how this works. Socrates introduces the image of the 
Divided Line in Republic as an account of the process of education (Plato, 2012, 509d-
511e). The Line works like a diagram, which separates four different cognitive 
stages and the objects of knowledge that correspond to them. Yet these are not 
developmental stages à la Piaget. Whereas Piaget’s stages are ways of thinking that 
the child passes through and overcomes, the Divided Line also provides a more 
static categorial delineation of the different kinds of knowledge that are available to 
human beings. At the bottom segment of the diagram drawn by the Line is illusion 
(eikos) and representation, which corresponds to our knowledge of objects in the 
sensible world. These are positioned lower for Plato by virtue of the way what we 
are experiencing with our senses is changing and perspectival. Higher up the Line is 
mathematical thinking (logismon), which involves detached and abstract thinking 
about formulae, rules, shapes, and numbers. The image of the Line, in this way, 
renders a hierarchy of ways of knowing the world, in which abstract and detached 
categories are seen as more ‘true’ and valuable than knowledge of particular, lived 
reality. 
On the basis of this interpretation, we might go back and consider how the Divided 
Line could be seen as informing Señor Robles’ conception of maths education. For 
Robles, as we have seen, learning maths involves training the mind to abstract and 
detach from particular instantiations of given objects – it is a matter of accessing 
general ideas by means of the intellect and reason. Moreover, as we have also seen, 
Robles accords such abstract rationality priority over other ways of thinking – he 
savours it, and takes it to be ‘foundational’ to the human being. On a standard 
reading of Plato, he too espouses a narrow and intellectualistic conception of 
education – and of the human being more generally – wherein cognitive 
ratiocination is prioritised over other ways of thinking and knowing. Is it merely 
incidental, then, the world in which the characters of The Schooldays of Jesus live is 
one in which ‘human desires are firmly under the control of reason’; it is ‘a world in 
which storms of passion have been exiled’ (Mulhall, 2017, p. 115)? Perhaps the 
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world Coetzee creates – as well as characters such as Robles – serve to caricature 
Plato’s image of Kallipolis, where the just society and human life is seen to be the life 
presided over by reason. It is supposedly the life of reason. 
Mark Jonas (2016) has recently argued that Plato’s philosophy seems ‘unattractive’ 
to modern educational thinkers. He contrasts this with positive attention that 
Aristotle’s philosophy, and particular his virtue ethics, has received in Anglophone 
philosophy of education and moral education. Jonas suggests that one of the main 
problems educational thinking today is precisely to do with Plato’s apparent 
centralisation of reason and the intellect.v In addition to this, Jonas also argues that 
there are further reasons why Plato’s philosophy seems unattractive to modern 
educators. This picks up on a further aspect of the Divided Line we have not yet 
considered. For maths is not, in fact, the highest segment of the diagram. Rather, it 
is ‘intelligence’, wherein the mind contemplates ‘the Forms’. On a standard reading, 
the Forms are eternal, unchanging, perfect models for all that exists in the sensible 
world. The Forms, read in this way, present a metaphysics of a truer, purer world, 
‘elsewhere’ to the sensible world we inhabit, and accessible only through the 
intellect. For Jonas, this bizarre apparent metaphysical commitment serves to make 
Plato’s philosophy ‘preposterous’ to the modern reader concerned with education, 
and understandably so. I noted at the outset of this section that the philosophy of the 
Dance Academy appears to invoke the theory of Forms. If this is right, and if the 
standard reading of Plato is correct, then it would seem there are some problems 
with my claim that Plato’s philosophy can help to give critical substance to a positive 
picture of what is happening in Coetzee’s academy. For does Plato’s philosophy not 
serve to make the practices of the Dance Academy sound all the more mysterious? 
But this depends upon our accepting the standard reading of Plato and the Forms. 
Should we accept it? Or might we – via Coetzee – come to approach another 
interpretation of Plato? 
Another Reading of Plato 
To answer these questions, let us introduce a further image of education outlined in 
Republic – and perhaps the most well-known and influential of those we have 
considered so far: the Cave allegory (Plato, 2012, 541a-521b). The allegory proceeds 
like this: imagine a group of prisoners who have since childhood been bound in a 
cave-like dwelling, bound and positioned so that they can only look ahead of them 
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and cannot turn their heads round: all they see are the shadows on the back wall. 
Behind them (they cannot see it) is a fire. In front of the fire some people manipulate 
puppets and other manufactured figures. All that the prisoners can see are the 
shadows these figures cast on the wall in front of them. The prisoners think this is 
all there is. They naturally take the shadows of the manufactured objects for truth. 
Now imagine what it would be like if one prisoners was set free and was suddenly 
forced to stand up, twist their neck, try to walk, and look towards the source of the 
light. The prisoner is in pain, confused by the puppets. He is dazzled by the light of 
the fire and wants to go back to the shadows and the things he can see. But imagine 
that this person is then taken up the steep slope, ‘suffering and complaining as he 
was dragged along’ (516a). He ascends upwards, past the puppeteers, towards the 
world outside the cave. When he reaches the mouth of the cave his eyes are filled 
with beams and he cannot see a single thing. But, in time, he will come to adjust. At 
first he will only see shadows and reflections in the world outside the cave but, over 
time, he will start to be able to look at things themselves, and even at the sun itself, 
source of truth and goodness.  
As Glaucon (one of Socrates’ interlocutors in Republic) registers, the Cave is a 
strange and surreal story (515a). What does it represent? There is not just one 
answer. On a standard reading the Cave is to be understood as re-figuring the image 
of the Divided Line, and as representing education as a path upward from darkness 
to light, concluding in a perfect state of perception and comprehension of the Forms. 
Yet the standard reading is not wholly adequate. The image of the Cave also differs 
from what is presented by the model of the Divided Line in significant ways. For 
one, and as Stanley Rosen has pointed, the Cave appears to give us much more detail 
about the educational process for the human being than the Divided Line. The Cave 
portrays ‘a drama of how the human soul stands with respect to education and the 
lack of it’ (2005, p. 269). Stanley Cavell registers a similar point in highlighting how 
the prisoners in Plato’s Cave allegory initially have to ‘turn themselves around and 
face the fact of their bewilderment’ – a revolution that Cavell aligns with ‘a 
reorientation of thought, and one which amounts to a reorientation (if momentarily) 
of one’s life’ (2004, p. 328). Cavell hereby invites the idea that the story of the Cave 
gives us something more than a diagram or system of knowledge – it is concerned 
with something more than ‘the structure of being and cognition’ (Rosen, 2004, p. 
269). Socrates himself appears to point us towards this – stating as he does that 
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education as it is shown in the Cave is not to be understood as the process of ‘putting 
sight into an eye that is blind’, but is rather like ‘an eye that cannot be turned from 
the dark towards the bright unless the whole body turns with it; it must be turned 
round, together with the whole soul’ (Republic, 516a).  
To take these thoughts further, we might consider another key difference between 
the Cave and the Divided Line: that the Cave story does not present a static image. 
As well figuring an initial moment of being turned, as Cavell recognises, there is also 
the subsequent movement upwards and, eventually, the return or descent back down 
into the Cave. This last point reminds us that the summary of the Cave story I 
offered above was only the first half of the story. For, after he has outlined the image 
of the prisoner exiting the cave, Socrates then raises the possibility that the 
emancipated person goes back ‘and sat down once more in his old seat’ (516e). Due 
to this, it is difficult to adequately read the Cave story as a straightforward and ‘once 
and for all’ journey from ignorance to enlightenment. As Stanley Cavell puts it, ‘the 
repetitive call to release ourselves from fixated images does not describe a 
continuous direction (as demanded by Plato’s myth of the Divided Line, the 
companion image to the Allegory of the Cave)’ (2004, p. 328). The Cave, put 
otherwise, does not give us the image of a path to a concluding state. Rather, what is 
suggested is a picture of the prisoner as perpetually moving between shadows and 
light. This is a picture of the trajectory of human life as one of oscillations and 
tensions – we might say, as being internally dynamic.  
This dynamism contrasts with the image presented by the standard reading of the 
Forms – in which these are taken to be static terms that exist above us in some 
eternal realm. At this point, however, we might well ask: is the standard reading 
wholly accurate? In his recent discussion, Mark Jonas works through different 
discussions of the Forms located within certain Platonic dialogues (Republic, Phaedo, 
Phaedrus, Symposium and the Timaeus). He convincingly argues, on the basis of this, 
that the standard reading which takes Plato as actually espousing the existence of 
some other world is overly simplistic. This is because, at the very least, the standard 
reading depends on the highly questionable assumption that Socrates is merely a 
mouthpiece for Plato’s own views. Moreover, and connected to this, the standard 
reading is apt to ignore what Jonas calls the ‘dramatic character of the dialogues’ – 
that is, it overlooks how the narrative context and embedding frame somewhat 
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undercut the idea that what is being put forward is being intended literally. Jonas 
therefore charges the standard reading with being ‘overly literal’ (2016, p. 315). His 
own suggestion, by contrast, is that we see the Forms as embodying a kind of 
‘regulative ideal.’ This draws on readings of Plato offered by Iris Murdoch and John 
McDowell, which suggest that, rather than portraying some ‘literal elsewhere 
attained through disembodied contemplation’, Plato’s discussion of the Forms works 
as a ‘metaphysical metaphor that aims to transform the reader’ (Murdoch quoted in 
Jonas, 2016, p. 317). 
I am in some sympathy with Jonas’ alternative conception of the Forms. But I should 
also like to suggest here that we might take this picture a little further. More 
specifically, I would argue that the Cave allegory can change our understanding of 
the Forms, and can thus help to bring us towards an alternative sense of Plato. To 
see this, note how the Forms can be understood as being like the image of the sun in 
the Cave allegory. Yet the sun is not merely a static, abstract object. This can be 
partly understood by the fact that it is not possible to look at the sun directly. We 
can only feel its presence and want to turn towards its warmth. And we can only 
benefit from the illumination it provides insofar as there are also shadows. In this 
sense, the sun is less an object for our direct contemplation, than something that 
draws us, something we are inclined towards, but that we can never reach in itself. 
In a similar way, we might read the Forms, not as being static ideals that actually 
somehow exist and that we are trying to get to, but rather as things we live in 
relation to. The Forms, we might say, are what we are always on the way towards. 
This way of reading the Forms and the Cave connects it to the notion of what 
Stanley Cavell calls ‘moral perfectionism’ – a sensibility that Cavell perceives in 
philosophers such as Emerson, Nietzsche and Wittgenstein. Cavell himself 
entertains the idea that there is ‘an earmark of a perfectionist ambition’ in Plato 
(Cavell, 2004, p. 317). Perfectionism is not the idea that you can reach some perfect 
state. Rather, it is the idea that in whatever you are doing, there is some way in 
which what you are doing could be improved or done better. This should be taken as 
a thought that has a bearing on one’s life as whole, and not just on specific moments. 
It is not just a matter of giving yourself a hard time or self-policing, and not a recipe 
for neurosis: on the contrary, it is psychologically healthy and robust. Central to the 
notion of perfectionism is of life lived as a kind of reaching towards or being drawn 
 12 
on by something. And, equally centrally, this is a recognition of the necessary 
dynamism in this – for if we were to become too fixated on or transfixed by a 
particular fantasy of perfection, then this would be a barrier to striving to live your 
life better here and now. False ideals and necessities are thus a barrier to Emerson’s 
call to ‘improve the hour.’ In a similar way to what is figured in the story of the 
Cave, the trajectory here is not of a single upward journey to a final state, but is 
rather a matter of oscillation – where there will always be some light and some 
shadow. This is the world we are living in and negotiating with, and giving 
ourselves to, at each moment. Reification of the Forms as some abstract ideal, such 
as we find in standard interpretations of Plato, obscures this. It obscures the more 
important image of education that Plato, like moral perfectionism, opens – as the 
personal struggle for something better in the light of something you cannot quite 
reach and understand. 
Can we return to the Dance Academy, in light of these thoughts? As we initially 
noted, Coetzee might well be tempting us to recall the problematic senses associated 
with the Forms via the apparent mysticism at work in the Academy’s image of maths 
education. Yet, at the same time, Coetzee’s Academy also invokes the alternative 
version of the Forms and Plato from the one that has just been unfolding. For 
dancing, as we noted above, is a dynamic (rather than static and primarily cognitive) 
realisation of a relation to number. As the master of the Academy puts it, in dancing 
‘the soul … follows the rhythm; each step instinct with the next step and the next’ 
(Coetzee, 2016, p. 97). It is worth pausing over the unusual use of ‘instinct’ here – 
where a term more familiarly used as a noun is used as an adjective. This reminds us 
that an instinct is more than merely a blind or impulsive animal reaction. 
Etymologically, ‘instinct’ stems from in-stinguere, where ‘in’ means something like 
being towards, and ‘stinguere’ means to prick. The word is also akin to instigare (to 
instigate). As an adjective, ‘instinct’ means ‘profoundly imbued’ and ‘infused.’ In this 
way, the Academy itself embodies the idea of being in relation to and drawn by 
something. This is a notion further brought out by Ana Magdelana’s claim that in 
dance we ‘surrender’ to numbers – ‘and while we dance, by their grace, they live 
among us.’ Figured here is a sense of passivity and receptiveness (indeed, the 
classical notion of grace is of a blessing or gift that is received without being sought 
or willed). This is something quite different to a relation to numbers that construes 
them as static, abstract objects.vi 
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We might approach this point in another way – viz. by saying that learning in the 
Dance Academy has more to do with habituation into matters of value, rather than 
with abstract concepts that are there to be grasped in a manner that is primarily if 
not purely intellectual. This helps to show how we can make sense of the idea that, 
in dance, numbers ‘manifest themselves in our midst.’ At t his point, it is worth 
recalling how, in Republic, Socrates comes to suggests that music and gymnastics are 
the best means of habituating the young child towards to kalon (that is, the good, the 
beautiful, the noble). Plato is here talking about the way the young child comes to 
learn and be disposed towards ideas that matter most in a human life, such as justice, 
love, and truth. Can what happens in the Dance Academy be thus seen as a model for 
other areas of education and the curriculum? In the final section of this paper, I 
should like to take these thoughts a little further. 
Moral Education and Literature 
Our discussion of the Dance Academy has just led us towards notions of justice, love 
and truth. Yet these are concepts that would more usually be taken to be the 
legitimate subject matter of what is called ‘moral philosophy’ – surely this is an area 
quite distinct from maths education that has been the focus of this paper hitherto? 
Certainly, the increasing specialisation of educational and philosophical research 
encourages us to think in terms of such separations and demarcations – hence the 
educational researcher concerned with, say, maths anxiety is likely to see their 
concerns as quite distinct and different in kind from those of the person concerned 
with the moral education. But note that such specialisation and division itself 
depends on a certain understanding of ‘morals’, ‘moral philosophy’, and ‘moral 
education.’ That is, it depends on taking such notions to represent a demarcated 
domain and field, defined and designated by reference to a system of distinctively 
moral concepts, moral questions, and, perhaps, a distinctive logic (which seeks to 
achieve consistency and uniformity in the landscape of our moral lives). But morals 
and morality do not have to be understood in this narrow, technical sense. There is a 
broader sense of morality, according to which we can see this not as a 
distinguishable region or strand but rather as a pervasive dimension of life, with value 
understood as going ‘all the way down.’vii In this way, we can start to see how there 
can indeed be a moral dimension to the learning of maths (this is, after all a practice 
that human beings take to be of value). Moreover, we come to see, more broadly, 
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how the dancing to the numbers described in Coetzee’s novel can be taken as a 
metonym for another kind of moral education. 
What I am suggesting here is something different to the more standard arguments 
for the connection between literature and moral philosophy and moral education. It 
may be instructive at this point to acknowledge the ways that narrower conceptions 
of moral philosophy and moral education have turned their attention towards 
literature and its educative value in recent years. Two predominant arguments have 
emerged: (1) that literature can offer examples to illustrate cases of moral reasoning 
that are more vivid and more engaging than the artificial thought experiments of 
philosophers; (2) that engaging with literature is a way of developing forms of 
sympathy, empathy and attention, by encouraging learners to attend to the 
specificity of a particular case. There is not space here to enter further into a 
discussion of these positions. viii Yet it is worth reflecting how far the Coetzee novel 
we have been considering in this paper can, at least on the face of it, fit with such 
arguments. For Coetzee’s novel is odd. It is odd even before we have even opened 
the book. It is called The Schooldays of Jesus but there is no character called Jesus, and 
the central child does not seem particularly remarkable or admirable, even though he 
has some unusual qualities. The plot itself is only half-formed, as are the individual 
characters, and they do not hold great interest because they are not very easy to 
recognise in terms of people we might know. It is hard to say, then, that this work is 
offering us rich exemplars or is appealing to our sympathies. Are there, then, no 
lessons from literature?  
Not at all. Yet the relation between literature and education needs to be conceived 
differently. Coetzee’s novel brings to light questions about knowledge and 
receptivity, and what it is to be. It is a kind of fable, but it raises questions about 
education and the substance of learning and teaching. These thoughts could not 
easily be articulated in a purely prosaic way, that is, in a conventional academic 
paper. Coetzee’s novel is not a mere representation or reflection of predefined 
concepts and theories. It does not serve ‘as a reminder of what we already know only 
too well’ (Attridge, 2004, p. 43). The style raises questions about thinking, and about 
education.  
Such thoughts may be extended, as we have done previously in this paper, by 
juxtaposing our discussion of Coetzee with a consideration of Plato. Indeed, it may 
 15 
be said that Republic draws us in to similar issues. For why does Plato present his 
ideas in Republic in the form of a dialogue? Why does his text include imagery and 
allegory, a variety of fictive or semi-fictive characters who have their own 
personalities, and a narrative structure? It would be a mistake to think that this is 
simply to make the ideas more engaging or apparent to the reader. For these 
‘literary’ features appear to ironically undercut a number of literal claims made in the 
text. Most notably, they serve to subvert Socrates famous ‘banishment’ of literature 
itself from Kallipolis, and the hierarchy ostensibly created by the Divided Line 
wherein philosophical practice is associated with contemplation of the ideal Forms 
(true knowledge), and literature is concerned with the mere representation of 
sensible things (and is thus ‘two removes from the truth’, given that sensible things 
are already but copies of the true Forms). Plato’s style, in this sense, raises the 
possibility that philosophy and literature can never entirely be kept apart. To put it 
more strongly, it raises the idea that, without literature, philosophy is at risk of 
becoming too narrowed, intellectualistic, and literal. Is it merely incidental, then, 
that the empty, curiously vacant, and pointedly underdescribed world that Coetzee’s 
Jesus novels depict is itself one in which what is sold as ‘literature’ is confined to 
technical manuals and guidebooks: ‘Teach Yourself Carpentry, The Art of Crocheting, 
One Hundred and One Summer Recipes, and so forth’ (Coetzee, 2013, p. 179)? 
In this way, we come to see how the ‘ancient quarrel’ between philosophy and 
literature is important and significant for the conception of moral education I am 
trying to advance in this paper. And perhaps we can risk taking these thoughts a 
little further here. For it might be said that what Coetzee and Plato’s invocations of 
the ‘ancient quarrel’ bring us to see is the centrality of the question of language. Let 
me explain. Traditionally, at least in some quarters, philosophy is understood as 
being in the business of assessing ‘propositions’. The interest philosophers take in 
language, therefore, tends to focus on how such formulations as ‘the cat is on the 
mat’ or ‘the bottle is on the table’ maps onto actual states of affairs (and hence 
whether this formulation of words is true or false). In fact, this kind of conception of 
language made an appearance earlier in our discussion in this paper. Recall how 
Señor Robles’ intellectualised view of maths was linked to a conception of language 
as what maps out and represents the world. Yet viewed in a propositional sense, 
language, like Robles’ conception of maths, is timeless, abstract and non-contextual. 
Propositional uses of language, we might say, contrast with statements and 
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sentences (a statement is, after all, something made at a particular time and in a 
particular place). Statements and sentences can, in this sense, be understood as part 
of the very fabric of the human world. Literature is constituted by statements and 
sentences – and therefore exemplifies a different conception of language to what we 
find at work in (at least some areas or conceptions of) philosophy. It takes us 
towards the view, that is, that language is not a closed and static designative tool 
but is rather productive and generative of new meaning – as can be seen in the 
simple way that the meaning of a sentence I utter in everyday life can be taken up 
and interpreted in unexpected and unanticipated ways by others: its significance can 
extend beyond its literal truth to the context and timing of the utterance. 
 
A consideration of language can thus help to reveal all the more critically the 
inadequacies with the view that philosophy and literature can be or should be kept 
entirely apart. For, in concerning themselves only with propositions, philosophers 
risk enclosing themselves in static, closed designations. How far do predominant 
conceptions of moral philosophy and moral education constrain themselves by an 
excessive focus on the propositional? Put more specifically, how far, do conceptions 
that take literature as being only externally related to philosophy (as an enrichment 
to a theoretical argument, for example) continue with the implicit assumption that 
philosophy is in the business of abstraction, intellectualism and hence stasis? Yet we 
can move beyond such constrictions – including those they bring to moral 
philosophy and moral education – by better attention to the internal relation between 
philosophy and literature. As I have suggested, this interweaving is borne out in the 
philosophical literature of Plato and the literary philosophy of Coetzee. Through 
them, we come to glimpse models of thinking and education that do not take their 
cue from abstraction and stasis, but rather from dynamic relations that are moral ‘all 
the way down.’  
Coda 
J.M. Coetzee excelled in both words and numbers throughout his early school life. 
He studied for a joint degree in Mathematics and English at the University of Cape 
Town. After moving to England, he secured a prestigious job as a computer 
programmer with IBM. During this time, Coetzee also wrote his PhD thesis, in 
which he attempted to put mathematical thinking into the service of literary 
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criticism in order to create a new form of textual interpretation called 
‘stylostatistics.’ Yet the conclusion of his PhD was that such techniques were 
ultimately inadequate as a means of interpreting a text. One of the main reasons he 
gave was because reading was not a linear process. Coetzee also became increasingly 
disillusioned with his work with computers. In particular, he was worried by the 
threat that such ‘toys’ will ‘burn either-or paths in the brains of [their] users and 
thus lock them irreversibly into its binary logic’ (Coetzee, 2003, p. 160). 
 
We cannot go too much further with biographical detail here. Yet it is worth 
reflecting on how the educational experiences and life trajectory of this author might 
itself bear out the themes being explored in this paper. Indeed, what Coetzee came to 
dislike about his work with computers appears precisely to be its tendency towards a 
narrowing and constricting of ways of thinking. His work with computers was 
presumably different from the experience of maths education he had had at school 
and at university, and it perhaps somewhat frustrated that earlier interest. And, even 
though he attempted to devise a system that would allow for a more systematic 
grasp and control of a work of literary fiction, his higher education eventually led 
him to recognise that such ways of thinking failed to do justice to the multi-
dimensionality of the text, where language, as we saw above, goes beyond stasis and 
fixity. It was, notably, for his own original works of literary fiction that Coetzee 
eventually came to win international acclaim (he has won the Booker Prize for 
Disgrace and The Life and Times of Michael K, and he also received the Nobel Prize 
for literature in 2003). His work, in this sense, serves as a noteworthy example of the 
contemporary power and education of fiction. But, given what we have seen in this 
paper of the particular ways in which Coetzee’s literature is centrally concerned with 
education, with refiguring the concept and remaking the practice, it is perhaps 
equally fitting to see it as an exemplar of the fiction of education. ixx 
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